Push additional reference and citation

	- Citation for uniform power useage to prevent side channel attacks

Signed-off-by: Paul Wortman <paw10003@engr.uconn.edu>

PBDSecPaper.tex

@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ From the development and design exploration of the function space a user should
 
 \subsection{Component Definitions}
 \label{Component Definitions}
-Component definitions relates to the security properties that different components have based on the definitions of their behavior and functionality.  Security properties, at the component definition level, include more physical properties of the varying components; reliability, confidentiality, uniqueness.  If the component in question were a processor then security properties could manifest as the following: cryptographic functions/functionality, is the component a TPM, secure key storage/protection, use of PUFs greater variability, uniform power consumption as a countermeasure to side-channel attacks, unexposed pins using a ball grid array (BGA), specific power drain/usage restrictions for operational functionality, anti-tampering or anti-reverse engineering properties of a component, etc.  A developer/designer will need to determine just how low-level the architectural space will go (e.g. what is the lowest level being incorporated into the mapping process), along with the properties that must be noted/maintained at such a level.  Further more the exploration of this design space will lead to creating higher-level implementations and functionality that is derived from the lower-level components.  As with any development and design procedure there will need to be tradeoff optimization that will examine any conflicting properties (e.g. size and heat dissipation requirements) when mapping the platform/architectural space toward the function space.
+Component definitions relates to the security properties that different components have based on the definitions of their behavior and functionality.  Security properties, at the component definition level, include more physical properties of the varying components; reliability, confidentiality, uniqueness.  If the component in question were a processor then security properties could manifest as the following: cryptographic functions/functionality, is the component a TPM, secure key storage/protection, use of PUFs greater variability, uniform power consumption as a countermeasure to side-channel attacks~\cite{Danger2009}, unexposed pins using a ball grid array (BGA), specific power drain/usage restrictions for operational functionality, anti-tampering or anti-reverse engineering properties of a component, etc.  A developer/designer will need to determine just how low-level the architectural space will go (e.g. what is the lowest level being incorporated into the mapping process), along with the properties that must be noted/maintained at such a level.  Further more the exploration of this design space will lead to creating higher-level implementations and functionality that is derived from the lower-level components.  As with any development and design procedure there will need to be tradeoff optimization that will examine any conflicting properties (e.g. size and heat dissipation requirements) when mapping the platform/architectural space toward the function space.
 
 \paragraph{Trusted Platform Modules}
 Different groups have tackled aspects of 
@@ -671,6 +671,9 @@ Analysis and Design of a Hardware/Software Trusted Platform Module for Embedded
 \bibitem{Ravi2004} Srivaths Ravi, Anand Raghunathan, Paul Kocher, and Sunil Hattangady, \emph{
 Security in Embedded Systems: Design Challenges}, ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS) Volume3, Issue 3 (August 2004)
 
+\bibitem{Danger2009} Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Shivam Bhasin, and Maxime Nassar, \emph{
+Overview of Dual rail with Precharge logic styles to thwart implementation-level attacks on hardware cryptoprocessors}, 3rd International Conference on Signals, Circuits and Systems (November 2009)
+
 \end{thebibliography}
 
 \end{document}